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Ask and the Commonwealth Shall Receive:
The Imbalance of Virginia's
Mental Health Expert Statute
Mark J. Goldsmith*
I. Introduction
Shortly before Dean Beckford went on trial for his life in a Richmond,
Virginia courtroom in 1997, the prosecution moved for an order requiring his
attorneys to disclose any psychiatric evidence they planned to introduce at his
capital sentencing should he be convicted. In addition, the prosecutors wanted
the defense to turn over all information that the defense mental health evaluators
had reviewed or considered while evaluating Beckford. Finally, so as to be in a
position to rebut Beckford's mitigating evidence at sentencing, the prosecution
wanted the judge to require Beckford to submit to a pretrial evaluation
(including, presumably, detailed questioning about the facts of the crime and his
own participation in it) by mental health evaluators selected by, and reporting to,
the prosecuting attorneys.'
The defense opposed the motion, citing Beckford's Fifth Amendment
rights against compelled self-incrimination. The court recognized the Govern-
ment's need to be able to prepare for possible psychiatric testimony at sen-
tencing. However, it fashioned stringent protections to ensure that this limited
right to discovery did not turn into an unconstitutional windfall of Government
access to the confidences and files of a defendant who had not yet been
convicted of any crime. The court determined that while the mental health
evaluations would be conducted prior to trial, the examination reports would
remain sealed until the jury found the defendant guilty and the defense
subsequently confirmed its intent to present mitigating mental health evidence
during the sentencing phase.2
* J.D. Candidate, May 2006, Washington and Lee University School of Law; B.A.
University of California, Los Angeles, March 2003. The author would like to thank Shannon
Borromeo for her love, patience, and understanding. The author is also indebted to Professor
David Bruck and the members of Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse, especially Justin Shane,
Tamara Graham, and Jessica Tanner. The author is also grateful to his family for their unending
encouragement and support.
1. Beckford v. United States, 962 F. Supp. 748, 751-52 (E.D. Va. 1997).
2. Id. at 752, 763-65.
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As it happened, Dean Beckford was charged in a federal court governed by
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.' Had he been tried in a Virginia state
courtroom just a few blocks away, however, the prosecution's request for pretrial
access both to Beckford himself and to the results of much of his lawyers'
investigation would have been treated very differently. Unlike the federal court,
which limited pretrial disclosures to the minimum necessary to allow the
prosecution a fair opportunity to prepare mental health rebuttal case, the Virginia
circuit court would have been obligated under Virginia Code section 19.2-264.3:1
("3:1") to order Beckford to relinquish all his mental health evidence to the
prosecuting attorneys prior to trial, once his lawyers decided to present mental
health mitigation in the event of conviction.4 In addition, the prosecution's
experts would have gained access to Beckford for a non-confidential pretrial
interview.' In addition, despite a statutory provision that on its face strictly limits
the prosecution's in-court use of its own evaluation to rebuttal of the specific
mitigating factors alleged by the defense, Supreme Court of Virginia decisions
have so eviscerated this restriction as to provide little or no protection to a
capital defendant trying to decide whether to risk cooperating with the
prosecution's mental health expert.6
This article addresses several issues that arise when a indigent capital
defendant exercises his right to a mental health evaluation and to present mental
health expert evidence in mitigation. Part II examines a capital defendant's
constitutional right to mental health expert evidence and the codification of that
right in Virginia's 3:1 statute. Part III discusses the prosecution's limited right
to the use of mental health testimony as rebuttal evidence during the sentencing
phase of a capital trial and explores the Fifth Amendment restrictions on the
Commonwealth's right to such evidence. This Part also examines federal case
law regarding the disclosure of mental health evidence to the prosecution and
compares 3:1 to its federal counterpart. Part IV considers the problem of
balancing a capital defendant's right against self-incrimination against the
3. Id. at 751-52.
4. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1 (Michie 2004) [hereinafter 3:1] (providing the
qualifications and procedures necessary for acquiring and using a government appointed mental
health expert for a capital defendant).
5. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1(F)(1) (granting the Commonwealth one or more
mental health experts to examine the defendant upon notice from the defense of its intent to
introduce mental health expert evidence in mitigation).
6. SeeJackson v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 538, 553 (Va. 1998) (permitting the prosecu-
tion to introduce mental health evidence relating to future dangerousness as long as such evidence
did not directly state that the defendant presented a future danger to society); Stewart v. Common-
wealth, 427 S.E.2d 394, 408 (Va. 1993) (determining that 3:1 does not prevent the prosecution from
presenting mental health evidence to support a finding of future dangerousness); Savino v.
Commonwealth, 391 S.E.2d 276,281 (Va. 1990) (holding that once a defendant notifies the State
of his intention to present mental health expert evidence in mitigation, he waives his entire Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
[Vol. 17:2
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prosecution's right to rebut mental health evidence. Specifically, this Part
explores the benefits and consequences of withholding mental health mitigation
evidence from the prosecution until the defendant has been found guilty and has
confirmed his intent to introduce such mitigating testimony. Part V considers
whether 3:1 violates an indigent capital defendant's Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination.
II. Presenting Mental Health Expert Mitigating Evidence
A. The Right to Offer Mitigating Evidence in a Capital Sentencing Proceeding
For more than three decades, the United States Supreme Court has
distinguished the death penalty from other judicially imposed punishments.7 The
death penalty is the one sentence that cannot be judicially corrected if improperly
imposed, and "its severity and irrevocability" mandate careful judicial
examination.' Thus, to minimize the arbitrary or capricious imposition of a
death sentence, the procedural safeguards of a capital case exceed those of other
criminal trials.9 One of these safeguards, the presentation of mitigation evidence
during the sentencing phase of a bifurcated capital trial, introduces the
defendant's background for the jury's consideration and allows the sentencing
body to make an individualized determination."° Moreover, mitigating evidence
enables the defense to counter both the graphic details of the offense and the
evidence introduced against the defendant."
Lockettv. Ohio"2 and subsequent Supreme Court cases established the general
principle that no relevant mitigating evidence may be excluded from the jury's
consideration in determining a capital defendant's sentence. 3 The Supreme
7. See Spaziano v. Florida 468 U.S. 447, 468 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (noting that in the twelve years since Furman, "every [Supreme Court justice] has
written or joined at least one opinion endorsing the proposition that because of its severity and
irrevocability, the death penalty is qualitatively different from any other punishment"); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 248 n. 11 (1972) (plurality opinion) (requiring a capital sentencing scheme
to provide a "meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is
imposed from the many cases in which it is not").
8. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (plurality opinion).
9. Id.
10. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (concluding that "the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments require that the sentencer .. .not be precluded from considering, as a
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of
the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death" (emphasis
omitted)).
11. See Jonathan P. Tomes, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't: The Use of Mitigation
Experts in Death Penaly Litigation, 24 AM.J. CRIM. L. 359, 362-64 (1997) (discussing the constitu-
tional requirement that a jury consider a defendant's background before imposing a death sentence).
12. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
13. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604; see Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 276 (1998) (stating that
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Court has concluded that "the 'meaning of relevance is no different in the
context of mitigating evidence introduced in a capital sentencing proceeding'
than in any other context."'4 Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."' 5
Therefore, it follows that " '[r]elevant mitigating evidence is evidence which
tends logically to prove or disprove some fact or circumstance which a fact-
finder could reasonably deem to have mitigating value.' "" If evidence could
persuade a reasonable juror to impose a sentence less than death, a state cannot
preclude the sentencer from considering it. 7 Complying with the constitutional
requirement concerning mitigating evidence in a capital case, Virginia statutory
law permits, at the penalty phase, the introduction of any evidence relevant to
sentencing and provides an illustrative, non-exhaustive list of potentially relevant
mitigating factors.'"
B. Ake v. Oklahoma
In 1985 the United States Supreme Court decided Ake v. Oklahoma9 and
solidified an indigent defendant's constitutionally protected right to a competent
psychiatrist to aid the defense in a capital case.20 Once "a defendant has made
a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a
significant factor at trial, the Constitution requires that a State provide access"
to a competent mental health expert.2 1 However, a defendant's right to such an
expert is restricted, and the Court specifically rejected the contention "that the
indigent defendant has a constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his
"the sentencer may not be precluded from considering, and may not refuse to consider, any
constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence"); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306 (1987)
(finding that "[s~tates cannot limit the sentencer's consideration of any relevant circumstance that
could cause it to decline to impose the [death] penalty').
14. Tennard v. Dretke, 124 S. Ct. 2562,2570 (2004) (quoting McKoy v. North Carolina, 494
U.S. 433, 440 (1990)).
15. FED. R. EVID. 401.
16. Tennard, 124 S. Ct. at 2570 (quoting McKqy, 494 U.S. at 440).
17. Id.; see Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,822 (1991) (stating that "a State cannot preclude
the sentencer from considering 'any relevant mitigating evidence' that the defendant proffers in
support of a sentence less than death" (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982))).
18. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B) (Michie 2004) (listing possible mitigating factors,
including whether "the capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance').
19. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
20. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74 (1985) (holding that an indigent defendant has the
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personal liking or to receive funds to hire his own. 2 2 The ruling left to the states
the decision of who should choose the mental health expert 3 In response, the
Virginia legislature enacted 3:1 slightly more than a year after Ake.
24
C. 3:1
Although the state legislature enacted 3:1 in 1987, the substance of the
statute has not changed since its inception nearly twenty years ago.2" Codifying
Ake, the statute guarantees an indigent capital defendant a mental health expert
to assist the defense in preparing and presenting mitigation evidence.26 Satisfying
the minimal requirements of 3:1 demands little of the defense. The statute
further requires the court-appointed expert to produce a report on the history,
character, and mental state of the defendant at the time of the offense.28
Although the report initially is protected by the attorney-client privilege, defense
counsel must relinquish all gathered information to the Government if the
defense decides to use the evaluation in court as mitigating evidence. 29 Section
22. Id. at 83.
23. Id.
24. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1 (Michie 2004) (providing the qualifications and
procedures necessary for acquiring and using a government-appointed mental health expert for a
capital defendant).
25. Amendments in 1987 and 1996 added further qualifications for experts and expanded
the professions available for appointment. Id. A 2003 amendment made grammatical changes to
the statute. Id.
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1 (A). The statute provides in part:
Upon (i) motion of the attorney for a defendant charged with or convicted of capital
murder and (ii) a finding by the court that the defendant is financially unable to pay for
expert assistance, the court shall appoint one or more qualified mental health experts
to evaluate the defendant and to assist the defense in the preparation and presentation
of [mitigating] information.
Id.
27. See id. (requiring only a motion by the defense and a finding that the defendant is
indigent).
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1(C). The statute provides:
The expert... shall submit to the attorney for the defendant a report concerning the
history and character of the defendant and the defendant's mental condition at the time
of the offense. The report shall include the expert's opinion as to (i) whether the
defendant acted under extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the
offense, (ii) whether the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly
impaired, and (iii) whether there are any other factors in mitigation relating to the
history or character of the defendant or the defendant's mental condition at the time
of the offense.
Id.
29. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1(D). The statute provides:
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3:1 (D) requires the defense to turn over the mental health report and all other
records related to the examination.
30
Furthermore, section 3:1 (F) grants the prosecution, upon request, a second
court-appointed expert to evaluate the defendant further for possible rebuttal of
the first expert's findings.31 Upon any attempt by the defendant to assert his
right against self-incrimination by refusing to cooperate fully with the
prosecution's expert, the court may exclude the testimony of the defense's court-
appointed expert.32 The statute also requires the Commonwealth's expert to
complete an evaluation report and to deliver it to both the prosecution and the
defense.
33
Lastly, Virginia Code section 19.2-264.3:3 ("3:3") limits the prosecution's
potential use of evidence obtained pursuant to 3:1.34 The statute forbids the use
of the defendant's statements and evidence derived therefrom to prove future
dangerousness at the penalty phase.3' Furthermore, the section restricts the use
of such statements to rebuttal evidence during the sentencing proceeding.
36
The report described in subsection C shall be sent solely to the attorney for the
defendant and shall be protected by the attorney-client privilege. However, the Com-
monwealth shall be given the report and the results of any other evaluation of the
defendant's mental condition conducted relative to the sentencing proceeding and
copies of psychiatric, psychological, medical or other records obtained during the
course of such evaluation, after the attorney for the defendant gives notice of an intent
to present psychiatric or psychological evidence in mitigation.
Id.
30. Id.
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1 (F)(1) (Michie 2004). The statute states that "[i]f... the
Commonwealth... seeks an evaluation concerning the existence or absence of mitigating circum-
stances relating to the defendant's mental condition at the time of the offense, the court shall
appoint one or more qualified experts to perform such an evaluation." Id.
32. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1(F)(2) ("If the court finds ... that the defendant has
refused to cooperate with an evaluation requested by the Commonwealth, the court may... bar the
defendant from presenting his expert evidence.").
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1(F)(1).
34. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:3 (Michie 2004) [hereinafter 3:3]. This statute was formerly
§ 19.2-264.3:1(G) until the Virginia General Assembly re-codified the statute as § 19.2-264.3:3 in
2003. For clarity, this article will refer to both statutes as 3:3. The statute states in part:
No statement or disclosure by the defendant made during ... a mental condition
evaluation performed pursuant to § 19.2-264.3:1 ... and no evidence derived from any
such statements or disclosures may be introduced against the defendant at the sentenc-
ing phase of a capital murder trial for the purpose of proving the aggravating circum-
stances [of future dangerousness or vileness]. Such statements or disclosures shall be





D. The Supreme Court of Virginia's Interpretation of 3:3
Although the language of 3:3 appears to restrict the prosecution's use of
mental health testimony, the Supreme Court of Virginia's interpretation of the
statute has undermined the value of this protection. In Savino v. Commonwealth,37
the court seemingly ignored the requirements of 3:3 and affirmed the trial court's
decision to permit the State to introduce both non-rebuttal and future
dangerousness 3:1 mental health evidence during the penalty phase.38 Similarly,
in Stewart v. Commonwealth,39 the court concluded that the Commonwealth's use
of mental health testimony by a "rebuttal" expert is not restricted to rebutting
mitigation.' Furthermore, Jackson v. Commonwealth4 found no error in the
prosecution's introduction of mental health evidence to support a finding of
future dangerousness.42 Part IV of this article discusses in greater detail the
consequences of the Supreme Court of Virginia's interpretation of 3:3 and
proposes a potential solution to the resulting constitutional concerns
surrounding 3:1. 43
III. The Prosecution's Use of Mental Health Expert Evidence
A. Right to Rebuttal Evidence
1. The Applicabiliy ofEstelle v. Smith
In Estelle v. Smith,' the Supreme Court recognized the Fifth Amendment
concerns raised by the prosecution's use of a mental health expert's evaluation
of a capital defendant.4" Although the defense had not placed Ernest Smith's
competency or sanity into issue, the Texas trial judge ordered a pretrial mental
health evaluation of the defendant to determine his competency to stand trial.'
The examining psychiatrist, Dr. James Grigson, conducted an interview,
confirmed the defendant's fitness to stand trial, and submitted a report of his
37. 391 S.E.2d 276 (Va. 1990).
38. Savino, 391 S.E.2d at 281-82.
39. 427 S.E.2d 394 (Va. 1993).
40. Stewart, 427 S.E.2d at 408.
41. 499 S.E.2d 538 (Va. 1998).
42. Jackson, 499 S.E.2d at 553.
43. Seeinfra Part IV.B (discussing the consequences of Satino and its interpretation of 3:1 and
3:3).
44. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
45. U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that "[n]o person shall... be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself'); see Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454,464-65 (1981) (concluding
that the State's use of disclosures made by the defendant during the pretrial psychiatric examination
implicated the Fifth Amendment's right against self-incrimination).
46. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 456-57, 457 n.1.
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findings in the form of a letter.4 7 At the penalty phase of the capital trial, the
prosecution called Dr. Grigson as the State's only witness.48 Based on the
pretrial interview, he testified in detail that he believed Smith presented a
continuing threat to society, and the Texas jury returned a sentence of death.
49
Although the Supreme Court found that coerced submission to the
prosecution's mental health expert may violate a defendant's Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination, the circumstances of Smith limit its holding to the
introduction of mental health expert testimony as non-rebuttal evidence.
5" The
facts of the case do not directly implicate Virginia's mental health expert statute
because much of the Court's decision in Smith focused on the prosecution's
failure to notify the defense of its intention to introduce Dr. Grigson's testimony
as evidence during the penalty phase and the defense's failure to give notice of
or introduce mental health expert testimony.51 In contrast, 3:1 requires the
defense to provide the Commonewealth with notice of its intent to present
mental health expert evidence in mitigation before the prosecution's right to its
own evaluation arises.5 2 Moreover, the Court in Smith specifically acknowledged
that "a different situation arises where a defendant intends to introduce
psychiatric evidence at the penalty phase., 5 3 Citing several decisions by Courts
of Appeal, the Court noted that a defendant intending to present psychiatric
testimony may be required to submit to an evaluation by the State's expert.54
47. Id. at 457.
48. Id. at 460.
49. Id. at 459-60. Dr. Grigson stated the following.
(a) that Smith "is a very severe sociopath"; (b) that "he will continue his previous
behavior"; (c) that his sociopathic condition will "only get worse"; (d) that he has no
"regard for another human being's property or for their life, regardless of who it may
be'"; (e) that "[tihere is no treatment, no medicine ... that in any way at all modifies or
changes this behavior"; (t) that he "is going to go ahead and commit other similar or
same criminal acts if given the opportunity to do so"; and (g) that he "has no remorse
or sorrow for what he has done.'
Id.
50. See Christopher Slobogin, Estelle v. Smith: The Constitutional Contours of the Forensic
Evaluation, 31 EMoRY L.J. 71, 76 (stating that "[tihe explicit holding of Estelleis of limited applicabil-
ity'.
51. Smith, 451 U.S. at 461,466.
52. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1(D) (Michie 2004) (requiring the defense to relinquish
its mental health expert's report to the prosecution "after the attorney for the defendant gives notice
of an intent to present psychiatric or psychological evidence in mitigation").
53. Smith, 451 U.S. at 472.
54. Id. at 465-66; see United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43, 47-48 (5th Cir. 1976) (permitting
the defendant to be required to submit to a mental health evaluation by the prosecution's expert);
Karstetter v. Cardwell, 526 F.2d 1144,1145 (9th Cir. 1975) (same); United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d
54, 66-67 (7th Cir. 1971) (same); United States v. Weiser, 428 F.2d 932,936 (2d Cir. 1969) (same);
United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719, 724-25 (4th Cir. 1968) (same); Pope v. United States, 372
F.2d 710, 720-21 (8th Cir. 1967) (same).
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Despite the limitations of its actual Fifth Amendment holding, Smith
recognized that a defendant's Fifth Amendment protections may preclude the
prosecution's mental health expert testimony under certain circumstances. 55 It
also provides two principles important to an analysis of Virginia's mental health
expert statute. The Court concluded that for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment's guarantee against self-incrimination, there is no distinction
between the guilt/innocence and penalty phases of a bifurcated capital trial.56
The Court also found that testimony obtained from communications during a
mental health examination of a defendant constitutes testimonial, rather than
real, evidence.57 These two principles will play significant roles in this article's
Fifth Amendment analysis of 3:1.5'
2. Buchanan v. Kentucky
Although Smith acknowledged that the prosecution's introduction of mental
health expert testimony violates an accused's Fifth Amendment right when the
evaluation is neither initiated nor used by the defense, the Supreme Court did
not explicitly address the constitutional implications of the prosecution's right
to use such testimony as rebuttal evidence until Buchanan v. Kentucky. 9 After
David Buchanan's arrest for murder, the prosecution and defense jointly
requested a psychological evaluation, and at his non-capital trial, the defendant
introduced reports and letters of the his mental condition to establish the
affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance.' In response and over
Buchanan's objection, the prosecution introduced damaging evidence from the
psychological evaluation that the court had ordered upon the request of both
parties.6' The jury found the defendant guilty, the state supreme court affirmed,
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
6 2
55. Smith, 451 U.S. at 466.
56. Id. at 462-63.
57. See id. at 463-65 (concluding that evidence presented by the prosecution's mental health
expert is testimonial because "the State used as evidence against the respondent the substance of
his disclosures during the pretrial psychiatric examination").
58. See infra Part V (conducting a Fifth Amendment analysis of 3:1).
59. Smith, 451 U.S. at 466; see Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 422-23 (1987) (stating
that "if a defendant requests such an evaluation or presents psychiatric evidence, then, at the very
least, the prosecution may rebut this presentation with evidence from the reports of the examination
that the defendant requested").
60. Buchanan, 483 U.S. at 409.
61. Id. at 411-12.
62. Id. at 412-14.
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Recognizing Smith as the applicable precedent for addressing Buchanan's
objection to the State's use of the psychological examination, the Supreme Court
distinguished the two cases without difficulty.6 3 The Court stated that
if a defendant requests [a psychiatric] evaluation or presents
psychiatric evidence, then, at the very least, the prosecution may rebut
this presentation with evidence from the reports of the examination
that the defendant requested. The defendant would have no Fifth
Amendment privilege against the introduction of this psychiatric
testimony by the prosecution.'
Because the defendant need not take the stand to introduce his own psychiatric
evidence, prohibiting the State from presenting rebuttal mental health evidence
would leave the prosecution with no means to respond." Consequently, the
Court concluded that "[t]he introduction of such a report for this limited rebuttal
purpose does not constitute a Fifth Amendment violation.'66
B. Fifth Amendment Limitations on the Prosecution's Right to Evidence
1. Related Work Product Concerns
Although not a Fifth Amendment issue per se, the work product doctrine
also focuses on the inappropriately forced disclosure of evidence. Recognized
by the Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor,67 the common law doctrine protects
from discovery materials that are "prepared by an adversary's counsel with an eye
toward litigation."68 The protection, however, is not absolute.69 The Court
qualified the protection by stating that upon showing that the "production of
[relevant and non-privileged] facts is essential to the preparation of [the] case,
discovery may be had."7 Buchanan held that the prosecution was entitled to the
court-appointed mental health expert reports once a capital defendant declared
his intention to present mental health evidence in mitigation, but there is no
Supreme Court authority approving the disclosure of all materials related to the
evaluation, as required by Virginia's 3:1 (D) statute.71 Furthermore, because 3:3
63. Id. at 422-24. The Court noted that not only had the defense joined the prosecution's
motion for the psychological evaluation, but also that Buchanan's entire defense relied on its ability
to establish his extreme emotional disturbance. Id. at 423-24.
64. Id. at 422-23.
65. Id. at 423.
66. Buchanan, 483 U.S. at 423-24.
67. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
68. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947). The Court also stated that "[t~his work is
reflected ... in interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions,
personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible ways." Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Bucbanan, 483 U.S. at 42 2 - 2 5 ;seeVA. CODEANN. § 19.2-264.3:1 (D) (Michie 2004) (stating
[Vol. 17:2
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precludes the Commonwealth from introducing mental health evidence for
purposes other than rebutting mitigating evidence during penalty phase, the
prosecution cannot plausibly contend that such evidence is necessary for the
preparation of the guilt/innocence phase of a capital case.72 Therefore, the
Supreme Court's work product doctrine calls into question 3:1 (D)'s disclosure
requirements that exceed the mandate of Buchanan.
2. Kastigar v. United States
Although Supreme Court of Virginia precedent may suggest otherwise, a
prosecutor does not have carte blanche to disregard the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination of an indigent capital defendant who indicates his
intention to introduce mental health evidence in mitigation.73 In Kastigarv. United
States,74 the defendants refused a court order to answer questions before a grand
jury despite a guarantee of immunity.75 Because the grant of immunity barred
the use of any direct or indirect evidence obtained through the compelled
testimony, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's findings of contempt and
rejected the defendants' claims of Fifth Amendment violations. 76 However, to
ensure that the prosecution could not exploit any indirect fruits of the compelled
testimony, the Court "impose[d] on the prosecution the affirmative duty to
prove that the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source
wholly independent of the compelled testimony., 77 Although the case revolved
around the protections afforded by immunity, Kasigar established that the
that upon notice of the defendant's intent to present mental health evidence in mitigation, "the
Commonwealth shall be given the report and the results of any other evaluation of the defendant's
mental condition conducted relative to the sentencing proceeding and copies of psychiatric,
psychological, medical or other records obtained during the course of such evaluation").
72. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:3 (Michie 2004) (limiting the Commonwealth's use of
3:1 testimony to rebuttal of the defendant's evidence in mitigation).
73. See Stewart, 427 S.E.2d at 407-08 (citing Sanino to support the contention that 3:1 does
not prohibit a mental health expert's opinion regarding future dangerousness); Savino, 391 S.E.2d
at 281 (holding that "when a defendant gives ... notice [that he intends to present evidence of his
mental condition in the penalty phase of trial], he waives his fifth amendment privilege against the
introduction of psychiatric testimony by the prosecution').
74. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
75. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 442 (1972).
76. Id. at 459-62.
77. Id. at 460. In an earlier immunity case, the Court stated that "[o]nce a defendant
demonstrates that he has testified, under a state grant of immunity, to matters related to the federal
prosecution, the federal authorities have the burden of showing that their evidence is not tainted
by establishing that they had an independent, legitimate source for the disputed evidence." Murphy
v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 n.18 (1964).
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prosecution's use of a defendant's compelled testimony must be strictly limited
to the purpose for which it is authorized.78
Virginia's 3:3 statute allows the State to use mental health evidence only in
rebuttal during the sentencing proceeding. 79 However, because 3:1 delivers to
the prosecution the mental health evaluation reports of both parties' experts, the
Commonwealth has access to the defendant's protected disclosures before the
commencement of the guilt/innocence phase.8" Consequently, Kastigarserves as
an indigent capital defendant's only protection against the prosecution's indirect
use of this evidence for investigatory leads.
3. United States v. Beckford
In the federal context, United States v. Beckfordst addressed the Fifth
Amendment concerns raised by the prosecution's access to mental health expert
82evidence prior to the defendant's introduction of such evidence in mitigation.
Before the commencement of Beckford's capital trial, the Government filed a
motion requesting the defense to comply with Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 12.2 ("Rule 12.2"). s3 At the time of the trial, Rule 12.2 had not yet
been amended to accommodate special issues that arise from the bifurcation of
capital trials.8 4 Because the rule only addressed guilt/innocence-phase defenses
such as insanity, Beckford confronted the conflict between the defendant's need
for penalty-phase procedures for securing and presenting mental health expert
evidence in mitigation and the Government's need to prepare for possible
rebuttal .8
Recognizing the need to balance the defendant's Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination and the prosecution's right to rebuttal mental health
expert evidence, the district court concluded that the interests of both parties
would be best served by "deferring the release to the Government of the
Government's expert reports and the defense expert reports until after a finding
of guilt necessitates a decision by the defendants on how to proceed with the
78. See Welsh S. White, Government Pychiatric Examinations and the Death Penalo, 37 ARIZ. L.
REv. 869, 885-86 (1995) (discussing the safeguards to protect a defendant's Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination).
79. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:3 (Michie 2004).
80. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1 (D),(E) (Michie 2004).
81. 962 F. Supp. 748 (E.D. Va. 1997).
82. Beckford, 962 F. Supp. at 761-63.
83. Id. at 751-52; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2 (providing the procedures necessary for obtaining
and using mental health evidence in a federal capital trial).
84. See Beckford, 962 F. Supp. at 754 n.3 (noting that "under the terms of the federal death
penalty statute, the [current] Federal Rules of Evidence [were] inapplicable to sentencing phase
proceedings").
85. Id. at 761-65.
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penalty phase."86 Because statements made during a court-ordered mental health
examination cannot be used in any manner against the defendant during the
guilt/innocence phase, the district court ruled that such reports should remain
sealed until the penalty phase of the capital trial.8 7 Furthermore, the court
reasoned that "[m]aking the report of the examination available to the
prosecution before conclusion of the guilt phase would present the risk of
inadvertent use and would lead to difficult problems respecting the source of
prosecution evidence and questioning in the guilt phase."8 Lastly, the court
anticipated the possibility that a defendant ultimately would choose not to
introduce mental health expert evidence during the penalty phase.8 9 Because the
Government is only entitled to examine the defendant to secure mental health
expert evidence for rebuttal purposes, "[t]he results of any examination by the
Government experts and the defense experts shall be released to the
Government... only after that defendant confirms his intent to offer mental
health or mental condition evidence in mitigation" during the penalty phase of
the capital trial.9" In this way, the district court protected the capital defendant's
right against self-incrimination without infringing upon the prosecution's right
to access rebuttal mental health evidence.
4. United States v. Hall
Less than two years after Beckford, the Fifth Circuit rejected a federal capital
defendant's contention that sealing the results of pretrial mental health
examinations was constitutionally mandated.9' In United States v. Hall,92 the
defendant unsuccessfully contended that the trial court could not condition his
right to present psychiatric evidence in mitigation upon his submission to a
government expert's psychiatric evaluation.9" In the alternative, Hall argued that
in the interests of protecting his Fifth Amendment right, the court should have
sealed the results of the mental health examinations until after the
guilt/innocence phase.94 The Fifth Circuit, however, determined that such a rule
86. Id. at 761.
87. Id. at 762.
88. Id. at 762 n.11.
89. Id. at 762.
90. Beckford, 962 F. Supp. at 764. The court recognized and addressed the notice implications
raised by the requirement of the defendant's post-guilt/innocence phase confirmation. Id. The
district court provided a defendant with a two-day window, following the return of a guilty verdict,
in which to confirm or disavow his intent to introduce mental health expert evidence at the penalty
phase. Id.
91. United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 398-99 (5th Cir. 1998).
92. 152 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 1998).




was unnecessary.9 The court citedAlderman v. UnitedState'6 to demonstrate that
once the defense makes a showing that the prosecution's evidence has been
influenced by the defendant's protected statements, "the government 'has the
ultimate burden of persuasion to show that its evidence is untainted.' ,9 Thus,
the court reasoned that Alderman's tainted-evidence test afforded Hall sufficient
means to preclude the prosecution's introduction of evidence improperly
influenced by the disclosures made during the defendant's mental health
examination.9"
Although Hall indicated that sealing mental health reports until the
sentencing phase of a capital trial was not constitutionally mandated, the Fifth
Circuit recognized Beckfora's reasoning." In fact, the court "acknowledge[d] that
such a rule is doubtless beneficial to defendants and that it likely advances
interests of judicial economy by avoiding litigation over whether particular pieces
of evidence that the government seeks to admit prior to the defendant's offering
psychiatric evidence were derived from the government psychiatric
examination.""'1° Such considerations also appear to have motivated the Supreme
Court and Congress to re-examine the appropriateness of the disclosure
requirements of Rule 12.2.1
5. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 12.2
In 2002 amendments to Rule 12.2 addressed the Fifth Amendment
implications of recent case law."02 The substantive 2002 amendment to Rule 12.2
replicated the sealing procedures implemented in Beckford and recommended in
Hall°3 Specifically, Rule 12.2(c)(2) requires that
the results and reports of any [court-ordered] examination... must be
sealed and must not be disclosed to any attorney for the government
or the defendant unless the defendant is found guilty of one or more
capital crimes and the defendant confirms an intent to offer during
sentencing proceedings expert evidence on mental condition."°
95. Id. at 399.
96. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).




101. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2, cmt. to 2002 Amendments (citing Beckfordand Hallto support
sealing the results of mental health examinations until the penalty phase of a capital trial).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(c)(2).
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Thus, Congress effectively codified Beckfords prophylactic rule requiring the
sealing of the government expert's reports until the conclusion of the
guilt/innocence phase and thereby averted what might have become routine
"taint" litigation in many federal capital cases."l 5 The Virginia legislature,
however, has proven to be less progressive.' °6
IV. Balandng a Capital Defendant's Fiftb Amendment Ri'ght and the Prosecution's
R'ght to Rebuttal Evidence
A. Brooks v. Tennessee andJenkins v. Anderson
Striking a balance between a capital defendant's constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination and the prosecution's entitlement to rebuttal 3:1
evidence is imperative in light of the dangers of the prosecution's pretrial access
to mental health reports. In 1972 the Supreme Court employed a balancing test
in Brooks v. Tennessee °7 to strike down a state law requiring a defendant to testify
prior to any other defense witnesses or not at all."' The Court weighed the
defendant's right to remain silent against the State's interest in preventing the
testimonial influence of the other defense witnesses and concluded, despite the
State's legitimate concerns, that the prosecution's interests were insufficient to
override the defendant's constitutional right."°
Similarly, in Jenkins v. Anderson," ° the Court used a balancing test to
determine that the State's use of the defendant's pretrial silence for impeachment
purposes did not violate his right to remain silent."' The Supreme Court
weighed the potential burden imposed on defendants' right to remain silent
against the State's interest in "enhanc[ing] the reliability of the criminal
process.""' 2 The Court concluded that "[o]nce a defendant decides to testify,
'[t]he interests of the other party and regard for the function of courts of justice
to ascertain the truth become relevant, and prevail in the balance of
considerations determining the scope and limits of the privilege against
self-incrimination.' ,,113
105. Id.
106. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1 (D) (Michie 2004) (requiring the defense to relinquish
its mental health expert's report to the prosecution "after the attorney for the defendant gives notice
of an intent to present psychiatric or psychological evidence in mitigation").
107. 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
108. Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 611-12 (1972).
109. Id. at 611.
110. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
111. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980).
112. Id. at 236-38.
113. Id. at 238 (quoting Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 156 (1958)).
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B. Sealing the Mental Health Expert Reports Until the Defense's
Post-Gui/Innocence-Phase Confirmation
Applying a Fifth Amendment balancing test to resolve the constitutional
tensions created by 3:1 requires weighing a defendant's right against self-
incrimination and the Commonwealth's interest in obtaining rebuttal mental
health evidence. This approach was taken by the federal district court in
Beckford. 4 Because the prosecution is barred from using or otherwise bene-
fitting from the mental health expert reports during the guilt/innocence phase,
the Beckford court reasoned that the appropriate balance required that the
examination reports be sealed until the sentencing phase of the capital trial.1"'
Conversely, the court concluded that pretrial notice and the right to its own
examination adequately protected the prosecution's right to rebuttal evidence." 6
Weighing the interests of both parties allowed the court to implement
procedures that protected the rights of both the defendant and the prosecution.
In contrast, 3:1 fails to strike an appropriate balance, and as a result, the
statute unconstitutionally burdens a defendant's Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination. Specifically, 3:1 unnecessarily grants the Commonwealth
unfettered access to mental health examinations-both the defendant's and its
own-before the guilt/innocence phase of the capital trial. 1 7 Moreover, the
Supreme Court of Virginia's interpretation of the statute permits both the
prosecution's use of mental health expert evidence in its sentencing case-in-chief
and to prove future dangerousness."'
1. Unnecessary Commonwealth PretrialAccess to Mental Health Reports
Buchanan and 3:3 only require an indigent capital defendant, upon request
for a mental health expert, to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination regarding rebuttal mental health evidence." 9 In addition, Virginia
114. Beckford, 962 F. Supp. at 761-62.
115. Id. at 762.
116. Id. at 763.
117. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1 (D) (Michie 2004) (requiring the defense to turn over
the mental health evaluation report and records upon declaring an intention to present such
evidence during the sentencing proceeding); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1(E) (requiring the
defense to provide notice of its intention to present mitigating evidence at the sentencing proceed-
ing "at least 21 days before trial").
118. See Stewart, 427 S.E.2d at 407-08 (concluding that 3:1 does not prohibit a mental health
expert's opinion regarding future dangerousness); Savino, 391 S.E.2d at 281 (holding that "when a
defendant gives ... notice [that he intends to present evidence of his mental condition in the
penalty phase of trial], he waives his fifth amendment privilege against the introduction of psychiat-
ric testimony by the prosecution'.
119. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:3 (Michie 2004) (restricting the Commonwealth's use
of disclosures made during a 3:1 evaluation to rebuttal evidence during the penalty phase); Buchanan,
483 U.S. at 422-23 (establishing the prosecution's right to the mental health experts' reports for
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law precludes the Commonwealth from introducing statements made during 3:1
evaluations or evidence derived therefrom for purposes other than rebuttal
evidence during the sentencing phase of a capital trial." ° Although the
prosecution is barred from any use of the mental health evaluation reports prior
to the defense's use of such evidence during the penalty phase, 3:1 needlessly
delivers to the Commonwealth both its and the defense experts' findings prior
to trial.121 Although the prosecution is constitutionally prohibited from
exploiting any information contained in the reports, the State's access to the
examinations' details poses an unacceptable risk that it may impermissibly gain
investigatory leads that could aid it in prosecuting the defendant and in
developing its case-in-chief on the issue of penalty.
2. Savino and the Commonwealth's Non-Rebuttal Use of Mental Health Eidence
In Savino, the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed a Fifth Amendment
objection to the State's mental health expert statute.'22 Joseph Savino pleaded
guilty, and the trial court convicted him of robbery and murder during the
commission of a robbery while armed with a deadly weapon.'23 In accordance
with 3:1, the defense had requested a mental health expert and gave notice of its
intent to present the expert evidence in mitigation.'24 The court then granted the
Commonwealth's motion for the appointment of a second expert. 2 '
During the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecution's case-in-chief
included mental health testimony from the Commonwealth's appointed
"rebuttal" expert.'26 The expert opined that at the time of the offense Savino
was not suffering from mental illness, that he was under no serious mental or
emotional disturbance, and that he was in no way impaired from appreciating or
controlling his behavior. 127 Furthermore, the expert testified, over the defense's
objection, that Savino's criminal past indicated a high probability of his future
rebuttal purposes).
120. VA. CODE ANN. 19.2-264.3:3.
121. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1(D), (F).
122. See Saino, 391 S.E.2d at 281 (holding that "when a defendant gives... notice [that he
intends to present evidence of his mental condition in the penalty phase of trial], he waives his fifth
amendment privilege against the introduction of psychiatric testimony by the prosecution").
123. Id. at 277 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(d) (Michie 2004)).
124. Id. at 281;seeVA.CODEANN. § 19.2-264.3:1(A), (E) (Michie2004) (providing an indigent
defendant with access to a mental health expert upon request and requiring a criminal defendant
to give notice of his intent to present mental health expert evidence in mitigation).
125. Savino, 391 S.E.2d at 281; see VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1(F)(1) (granting the Com-
monwealth one or more mental health experts to examine the defendant upon notice from the
defense of its intent to introduce mental health expert evidence in mitigation).




dangerousness. 2 Savino offered no mental health evidence in mitigation, and
the trial court sentenced him to death.
129
On appeal, Savino relied upon Smith to argue that 3:1 violated his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination." However, the Saimno court
distinguished Smith on the grounds that Smith neither requested a psychiatric
evaluation nor introduced psychiatric evidence.' The court further cited
Buchanan and Powell v. Texas32 for the proposition that "when a defendant
requests a psychiatric examination in order to prove a mental-status defense, he
is deemed to have waived the right to raise a fifth amendment challenge to the
prosecution's use of evidence obtained through that examination to rebut the
defense."' 33 Relying on Buchanan and Powell, the Supreme Court of Virginia
concluded that 3:1 does not violate a defendant's Fifth Amendment right."
On habeas corpus review, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the Supreme Court
of Virginia's holding. 35 Among other contentions, Savino asserted that the
testimony of the Commonwealth's mental health expert violated his Fifth
Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination.'3 6 The court first
observed that a defendant complying with 3:1 is not entitled to Fifth
Amendment protection against the introduction of rebuttal mental health expert
evidence.13  However, rather than applying Buchanan to find that such a
defendant waives his right to remain silent regarding rebuttalevidence, the Fourth
Circuit inappropriately concluded that once such a defendant gives notice of his
intent to present mental health evidence in mitigation, he surrenders his entire
right against compelled self-incrimination. 3 Therefore, after Savino, an indigent
capital defendant's request pursuant to 3:1 effectively opens the door for the
128. Id.
129. Id. at 277.
130. Id. at 281; see U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that "[n]o person shall... be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself"); see also Smith, 451 U.S. at 468 (holding that the
admission of psychiatric evidence from an evaluation that the defense did not initiate violated the
defendant's Fifth Amendment rights).
131. Savino, 391 S.E.2d at 281.
132. 492 U.S. 680 (1989).
133. Savino, 391 S.E.2d at 281; see Powell v. Texas, 492 U.S. 680,684 (1989) (noting that Smitb
and Buchanan allow the prosecution to use evidence obtained in the defense expert's evaluation of
the defendant to rebut the defense); Bucbanan, 483 U.S. at 422-23 (stating that at a minimum, the
prosecution is entided to mental health evidence for rebuttal purposes once a defendant requests
a mental health examination or introduces such evidence).
134. Saino, 391 S.E.2d at 281.
135. Savino v. Murray, 82 F.3d 593, 606 (4th Cir. 1996). See generaly C. Cooper Youell, IV,
Case Note, 9 CAP. DEF. J. 21 (1996) (analyzing Savino v. Murray, 82 F.3d 593 (4th Cir. 1996)).
136. Savino, 82 F.3d at 603.
137. Id. at 604.
138. Id. at 604-05.
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prosecution to use the fruits of a mental health evaluation against him, even if
the defendant ultimately chooses not to introduce such evidence in mitigation.
139
Although such procedures smack of a Fifth Amendment violation, both the
Supreme Court of Virginia and the Fourth Circuit have so far approved them.'"
Absent from the Fourth Circuit's Savino opinion is an adequate examination
of 3:3.' The court accurately stated that the statute only permits the rebuttal
use of the defendant's statements or disclosures made during a 3:1
examination." 2 However, the Fourth Circuit's declaration that "the statute does
not preclude use of the opinion of the Commonwealth's examiner for
establishing an aggravating circumstance" is a misrepresentation of Virginia
law.' 4 3 In fact, 3:3 clearly states that "no evidence derived from any such
statements or disclosures may be introduced against the defendant at the
sentencing phase of a capital murder trial for the purpose of proving the
aggravating circumstances [of future dangerousness or vileness]."'" The two
statements are irreconcilable, and both the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme
Court of Virginia have declined subsequent opportunities to resolve this
conflict.45
3. The Commonwealth's Use of Mental Health Evidence to Prove Future Dangerousness
and Savino's Progeny
Three years after the court's decision in Savino and while Savino's federal
habeas appeal was still pending, the Supreme Court of Virginia confirmed its
interpretation of 3:1.'" In Stewart, the court once again addressed a defendant's
contention that Virginia's statute forbids the prosecution's rebuttal evaluation of
future dangerousness.' 47 The court "[held that] the provisions of Code § 19.2-
264.3:1(F) do not limit the scope of the expert's examination to matters of
139. Id.
140. See id. (affirming the Supreme Court of Virginia's interpretation of 3:1 and 3:3); Stewart
v. Angelone, No. 97-26, slip op. at 11 (4th Cir. May 29, 1998) (same); Stewart, 427 S.E.2d at 408
(same); Savino, 391 S.E.2d at 281 (concluding that 3:1 does not violate an indigent capital defen-
dant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination).
141. Satino, 82 F.3d at 603-06.
142. Id. at 605.
143. Id.
144. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:3 (Michie 2004).
145. See Stewart, No. 97-26, slip op. at 11 (affirming the Supreme Court ofVirginia's interpreta-
tion of 3:1 and 3:3); Stewart, 427 S.E.2d at 408 (concluding that 3:1 does not violate an indigent
capital defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination).
146. See Stewart, 427 S.E.2d at 408 (citing Savino to support the contention that 3:1 does not
prohibit a mental health expert's opinion regarding future dangerousness).
147. Id. at 407-08. See general4 Mari K. Simmons, Case Note, 6 CAP. DEF. J. 21 (1993)
(analyzing Stewart v. Commonwealth, 427 S.E.2d 394 (Va. 1993)).
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mitigation."' 48 The irony of such a conclusion is that the supreme court was
correct.149 Subsection F of 3:1 does not limit expert testimony to mitigation; 3:3
does.' However, rather than conduct its own analysis, the court relied on
Savino's conclusions and "[found] no reason to modify those rulings."'
' 51
In the years since Satino and Stewart, the Supreme Court of Virginia has
remained steadfast in its analysis of 3:1. In Jackson, it permitted the prosecution's
introduction of expert testimony that "Jackson exhibited more of the risk factors
for future violent acts 'than many of the other [criminal] defendants [the mental
health expert had] evaluated.' ,,12 Despite 3:3's preclusion of any evidence
"derived from" statements made during the mental health examinations, the
court found no error in the trial court's admission of the testimony." 3 Because
the expert "quantified neither the extent of those factors nor the probability of
Jackson's future dangerousness and he did not opine that Jackson would be a
danger in the future," the court found no violation of 3:3.15 In other words,
unless the prosecution's expert explicitly testifies during the sentencing
proceeding that a defendant presents a future danger to society, Virginia state
courts are unlikely to recognize a violation of 3:3.
Most recently, the Supreme Court of Virginia in Winston v. Commonwealth 5'
rejected the defendant's assertion that, as an alternative to 3:1, Ake provided a
direct, constitutionally mandated avenue for the appointment of a mental health
expert for mitigation.'56 The court viewed the strategy as an unacceptable
attempt to avoid the statutory notice requirements and determined that a Virginia
capital defendant is not entitled to a mental health expert on grounds
independent of 3:l.17 Consequently, 3:1 appears to be the only means by which
an indigent capital defendant may secure the services of a mental health expert.
148. Stewart, 427 S.E.2d at 408.
149. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1 (Michie 2004) (providing the qualifications and
procedures necessary for acquiring and using a govemment-appointed mental health expert for a
capital defendant).
150. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1 (F) (granting the Commonwealth one or more court-
experts to evaluate the mental health of the defendant and prescribing the procedures thereto); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:3 (Michie 2004) (proscribing the use of evidence derived from statements
made during a 3:1 evaluation to establish future dangerousness or vileness and limiting the prosecu-
tion's use of such statements to rebuttal evidence).
151. Stewart, 427 S.E.2d at 408.




155. 604 S.E.2d 21 (Va. 2004).
156. Winston v. Commonwealth, 604 S.E.2d 21, 33-34 (Va. 2004). For a complete discussion
and analysis of Winston, see generally Justin B. Shane, Case Note, 17 CAP. DEF. J. 347 (2005)
(analyzing Winston v. Commonwealth, 604 S.E.2d 21 (Va. 2004)).
157. Winston, 604 S.E.2d at 33-34.
[Vol. 17:2
COMMONWEALTH SHALL RECEIVE
Without judicial enforcement of the 3:1 procedures in their entirety,
indigent capital defendants face a dilemma: the declaration of an intention to
present mental health expert evidence in mitigation entitles the prosecution to
the results of at least two evaluation reports, the contents of which the State may
use to rebut evidence offered by the defendant during sentencing and to
establish an aggravating circumstance in its penalty phase case-in-chief. As
Virginia law stands, defendants are forced to consider these consequences in
addition to the inevitable danger that the prosecution may exploit the contents
of the mental health reports and benefit indirectly from its early access to the
defendant's protected statements.
4. Sealing Mental Health Expert Reports to Properly Balance a Defendant's Fifth
Amendment Right and the Commonwealth's Right to Rebuttal Evidence
Deferring the release of the mental health expert reports to the
Commonwealth until post-guilt/innocence-phase confirmation of the defense's
intention to present such evidence during the penalty phase provides a simple
and equitable solution to the Fifth Amendment concerns raised by 3:1. Beckford
thoroughly addressed the benefits of such procedures in the federal context, and
the same analysis is relevant and applicable to Virginia's 3:1 statute.'58 Because
the State's use of mental health evidence is limited to rebuttal evidence at penalty
phase, the elimination of the threat that the prosecution will indirectly benefit
from the protected disclosures should not unfairly affect the Commonwealth.
Not only does sealing safeguard the defendant's Fifth Amendment interests, but
it also promotes judicial efficiency by removing the need for Kastigar-type
inquiries to resolve allegations of taint of prosecution evidence.'59 The pro-
secution remains unharmed, and the defendant's privilege against self-incrim-
ination is protected.
In addition to eradicating the possible temptation to misuse a defendant's
protected statements, withholding the 3:1 reports from the prosecution until the
defense's post-guilt/innocence-phase confirmation of intent to use mental health
evidence in mitigation also enforces a plain reading of the statute. Despite Savino
and its progeny, 3:3 clearly forbids the use both of statements made during a
mental health evaluation and of evidence derived from such statements for non-
rebuttal purposes or to prove future dangerousness."6 Delivering the 3:1 reports
only after the defendant reaffirms his intention ensures the State's compliance
with the statutory limitation of mental health expert testimony as rebuttal
158. See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing the role of Beckford as a precursor to the 2002 amend-
ment to Rule 12.2).
159. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the burden on the prosecution to establish that evidence
allegedly tainted by protected disclosures was obtained through an independent source).
160. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:3 (Michie 2004).
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evidence."' Again, sealing protects the defendant's Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination without injury to the prosecution.
V. Fifth Amendment Analysis of 3:1
Despite its language and broad application, the Fifth Amendment does not
provide an absolute protection against self-incrimination.'62 The Constitution
states that a criminal defendant cannot be "compelled... to be a witness against
himself," thus protecting a defendant from coerced and self-incriminating
evidence. 6 3 For purposes of Fifth Amendment protection, however, the
Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California"64 distinguished between physical and
communicative evidence. 6 Stated plainly, the Court concluded that "the
privilege is a bar against compelling 'communications' or 'testimony,' but that
compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of 'real or physical
evidence' does not violate it.' 66 Therefore, the Fifth Amendment requires a
disclosure to be self-incriminating, compelled, and testimonial to invoke the con-
stitutional protection.'67 However, 3:1 needlessly and impermissibly risks the
violation of a capital defendant's Fifth Amendment right, and the Supreme Court
of Virginia's interpretation of the statute violates the privilege outright.
A. Sedf-Inciminafing
In Hoffman v. United States, 68 the Supreme Court addressed the self-
incrimination element of the Fifth Amendment. 169 The privilege against self-
incrimination "extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction
... [and] embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence
needed to prosecute the claimant."' 70 However, because the Court addressed
self-incrimination in the context of a criminal prosecution, Hoffman is not directly
161. Id.
162. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that "[n]o person shall... be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself").
163. Id.
164. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
165. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64 (1966).
166. Id. at 764.
167. See Donna H. Lee, In the Wake ofAke v. Oklahoma: An Indgent Criminal Defendant's Lack
ofExParteAcess to Expert Services, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 154, 176 (1992) (stating that "the key factors
in a fifth amendment inquiry are whether the disclosure is testimonial, self-incriminating, and
compelled").
168. 341 U.S. 479 (1951).




applicable to the penalty phase of a bifurcated death-penalty trial. The defendant
would have already been prosecuted and convicted of capital murder. 1 '
In Smith, the Supreme Court eliminated any distinction between self-
incrimination for the purposes of conviction and for the purposes of
sentencing." Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Burger stated that
the Court "[could] discern no basis to distinguish between the guilt and penalty
phases of respondent's capital murder trial so far as the protection of the Fifth
Amendment privilege is concerned."' 73 Therefore, information gained from a
defendant and presented during the sentencing phase of a capital trial is self-
incriminating if it directly supports the imposition of a death sentence or
provides a "link in the chain of evidence" that leads to the imposition of a death
sentence.
7 4
A mental health expert's evaluation of a criminal defendant may delve into
his personal history and thought processes and potentially could expose the
defendant's narrative of the crime and both adjudicated as well as unadjudicated
prior criminal conduct that would otherwise have remained confidential.
75
Although Buchanan entitles the prosecution to the mental health evidence the
defense intends to present during the penalty phase, 3:1 unnecessarily delivers
this evidence to the Commonwealth prior to the commencement of the trial.
176
Because Virginia's mental health expert statute grants the prosecution complete
access to the defense's expert report and to a second expert examination before
the start of the guilt/innocence phase, the prosecution has the unfettered
opportunity not only to discover otherwise inaccessible evidence as it readies its
case for a conviction but also to prepare its affirmative case for death at the
171. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3 (Michie 2004) (describing the bifurcation into
guilt/innocence and penalty phases of a Virginia capital trial).
172. See Smith, 451 U.S. at 462-63 (finding no difference between guilt/innocence and
sentencing phases of a capital trial for purposes of Fifth Amendment protection).
173. Id.
174. Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486.
175. See White supra note 78, at 870 (discussing the types of information that can be obtained
through a psychiatric examination).
176. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1(D) (Michie 2004) (stating that upon notice of the
defendant's intent to present mental health evidence in mitigation, "the Commonwealth shall be
given the report and the results of any other evaluation of the defendant's mental condition
conducted relative to the sentencing proceeding and copies of psychiatric, psychological, medical
or other records obtained during the course of such evaluation"); Buchanan, 483 U.S. at 422-23
(stating that "if a defendant requests such an evaluation or presents psychiatric evidence, then, at
the very least, the prosecution may rebut this presentation with evidence from the reports of the
examination that the defendant requested').
20051
316 CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL [Vol. 17:2
sentencing phase. 177 Thus, the intolerably high risk that the statute will yield self-
incriminating evidence satisfies the first factor of a Fifth Amendment inquiry.
Furthermore, Satino and subsequent cases actually permit the
Commonwealth to introduce in its sentencing case-in-chief evidence obtained
through 3:1 examinations. 17' Rather than restricting the State to the statutory
limits of mental health expert evidence, the Supreme Court of Virginia has
endorsed the prosecution's non-rebuttal use of such evidence to support its case
for the death penalty.179 Thus, 3:1 meets the self-incriminating component of the
analysis.
B. Compelled
The second factor in the Fifth Amendment analysis is compulsion, and the
Supreme Court has held that the "government cannot... impos[e] sanctions to
compel testimony which has not been immunized."'' ° Addressing the issue on
a case-by-case basis, the Court has recognized multiple penalties that amount to
impermissible compulsion, including the following- contempt sanctions,' 8'
disbarment and damage to professional reputation, 2 loss of income and
economic penalties,8 3 and the loss of the right to participate in political
associations."8 While each of these sanctions places unacceptable hardships
177. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1 (D) (providing the Commonwealth with access to the
defense expert's report and findings once the defendant gives notice of the intent to use mental
health evidence in mitigation); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1 (F)(1) (stating that, upon notice, the
court will appoint one or more mental health experts for the Commonwealth to evaluate the
defendant and the findings will be made available to both the prosecution and the defense); see also
White, supra note 78, at 870 (stating that "[d]uring the psychiatric examination, the government
psychiatrist may learn of prior conduct that would not otherwise be accessible to the government").
178. Savino, 391 S.E.2d at 280; seeJackson, 499 S.E.2d at 553 (permitting the Commonwealth's
introduction of mental health expert testimony regarding the defendant's propensity to commit
future violent acts); Ste wart, 427 S.E.2d at 408 (citing Satino to support the contention that 3:1 does
not prohibit a mental health expert's opinion regarding future dangerousness).
179. SeeJackson, 499 S.E.2d at 553 (permitting the Commonwealth's introduction of mental
health expert testimony regarding the defendant's propensity to commit future violent acts); Stewart,
427 S.E.2d at 408 (permitting the prosecution's use of mental health testimony for purposes other
than rebuttal evidence).
180. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806 (1977); see Lee, supra note 167, at 177-78
(stating that "[c]ompulsion can consist of either direct external sanctions or indirect modes of
coercion designed to force self-incriminating disclosures').
181. See Murpby, 378 U.S. at 55 (finding that giving a defendant the options of self-incrimina-
tion, perjury, or contempt constitutes compulsion).
182. See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 516 (1967) (finding that "[t]he threat of disbarment
and the loss of professional standing, professional reputation, and of livelihood are powerful forms
of compulsion").
183. See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 71, 82 (1973) (concluding that the cancellation of
contracts and the five-year disqualification from contracting constituted impermissible compulsion).
184. See Cunningbam, 431 U.S. at 808 (depriving a defendant his office in a political party
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upon a defendant, the Supreme Court has yet to establish a bright-line rule for
evaluating the appropriateness of such compulsion.
In Lefkowir v. Cunningbam, s the Supreme Court held that the "government
cannot .. . impos[e] sanctions to compel testimony which has not been
immunized." ' 6 To the extent that 3:3 protects the statements a defendant makes
during a mental health evaluation by limiting the prosecution's use to rebuttal
evidence, the statute seemingly falls within the bounds of acceptable
compulsion.187 However, because the State receives the mental health reports
prior to the guilt/innocence phase of the capital trial, 3:l's security is reduced to
a requirement that the prosecution be able to demonstrate an independent
source for evidence suspected of being tainted by the defendant's protected
statements.188 This burden shift mandated by Kasigar does not rise to the level
of "immunity" envisioned in Cunningbam.
In addition to the unacceptable advantages that the Commonwealth may
enjoy during the guilt/innocence phase-the indirect fruits of the mental health
reports-the Supreme Court ofVirginia's interpretation of 3:1 removes the teeth
of the 3:3 protections."8 9 Consequently, 3:1 now requires a defendant to testify
in a manner constitutionally inconsistent with Cunningham. Therefore, 3:1
compels a criminal defendant to submit to the prosecution's expert evaluation
upon threat of the loss of the right to present highly relevant mitigating
evidence."' °
C. Teslimonial
The Fifth Amendment does not prohibit the prosecution's access to and
use of all compelled and self-incriminating evidence. For example, a criminal
constituted compulsion).
185. 431 U.S. 801 (1977).
186. Cunningbam, 431 U.S. at 806.
187. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:3 (Michie 2004) (restricting the Commonwealth's use
of disclosures made during a 3:1 evaluation to rebuttal evidence during penalty phase).
188. See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460 (stating that "the prosecution [has] the affirmative duty to
prove that the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent
of the compelled testimony").
189. See Jackson, 499 S.E.2d at 553 (permitting the prosecution to introduce mental health
evidence relating to future dangerousness as long as such evidence did not directly state that the
defendant presented a future danger to society); Stewart, 427 S.E.2d at 407-08 (determining that 3:1
does not prevent the prosecution from presenting mental health evidence to support a finding of
future dangerousness); Savino, 391 S.E.2d at 281 (holding that once a defendant notifies the State
of his intention to present mental health expert evidence in mitigation, he waives his entire Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
190. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1 (F)(2) (Michie 2004) (allowing the court to bar the




defendant may be required to cooperate with the prosecution by "submit[ting]
to fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for
identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to
make a particular gesture. '19' Although such "real" evidence is not
constitutionally offensive, the Fifth Amendment protects a defendant's self-
incriminating disclosures of a testimonial nature.9 2 The distinction between real
and testimonial nature is an essential element of a Fifth Amendment inquiry.'93
The Supreme Court has held that requiring a defendant "to disclose the
contents of his own mind" is paradigmatic of testimonial evidence because of its
communicative character. 194 Furthermore, the Court in Smith concluded that
evidence presented by the prosecution's mental health expert was testimonial
because "the State used as evidence against respondent the substance of his
disclosures during the pretrial psychiatric examination."' 9 5 Thus, information
that is damaging to a defendant and gained by the prosecution through a mental
health examination of the defendant pursuant to Virginia's 3:1 statute is
testimonial. Requiring a defendant to disclose incriminating mental health
evidence to the Commonwealth without limiting the prosecution's use of such
evidence to rebuttal testimony constitutes impermissible compulsion under the
Fifth Amendment.
VL Conclusion
Although 3:1 protects an indigent capital defendant's right to present
mental health expert evidence in mitigation during penalty phase, Savino and
subsequent cases established the Commonwealth's court-sanctioned right to
circumvent the very protections 3:1 was instituted to protect. Contrary to the
provisions of the statute, the prosecution may introduce mental health evidence
in its sentencing case-in-chief, rather than rebuttal.'96 Similarly, a State may
introduce non-rebuttal expert testimony of a defendant's potential future
191. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764.
192. See Lee, supra note 167, at 175-81 (discussing the components of a Fifth Amendment
analysis).
193. See Peter Arenella, Schmerber and the Privikge Against Sel-Inarimination: A Reappraisal, 20
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 31, 38-40 (1982) (distinguishing real evidence from testimonial evidence).
194. See Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118,128 (1957) (determining that such a compelled
disclosure of evidence "is contrary to the spirit and letter of the Fifth Amendment"); see also Doe
v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988) (stating that "in order to be testimonial, an accused's
communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose informa-
tion'.
195. Smith, 451 U.S. at 465; see Slobogin, supra note 50, at 85-87 (describing the testimonial
nature of clinical data).
196. See Savino, 391 S.E.2d at 281 (holding that "when a defendant gives... notice [that he
intends to present evidence of his mental condition in the penalty phase of trial], he waives his fifth
amendment privilege against the introduction of psychiatric testimony by the prosecution').
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dangerousness under the condition that the witness gives no explicit opinion
regarding the aggravating factor.'97
Because the Supreme Court of Virginia does not adequately safeguard a
defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, amending 3:1 to
provide sealing procedures comparable to Rule 12.2 would provide the necessary
protections. Virginia courts should deliver the mental health reports to the
Commonwealth only after the guilt/innocence phase and upon the defendant's
confirmation of his intent to use such evidence during the sentencing
proceeding. Because the State is restricted to using mental health testimony only
as rebuttal evidence during the penalty phase, such procedures would not
unfairly burden the Commonwealth and would protect the defendant's Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
As interpreted by the Supreme Court of Virginia, 3:1 violates the Fifth
Amendment. An analysis of the statute reveals mental health evidence obtained
by a 3:1 examination to be self-incriminating, compelled, and testimonial.
Because the Supreme Court of Virginia has proven unwilling to enforce the
statutory language, amending the disclosure rules of 3:1 to mirror those of Rule
12.2 appears to be the only feasible solution to the Fifth Amendment violation.
197. See Jackson, 499 S.E.2d at 553 (permitting the Commonwealth's introduction of mental
health expert testimony regarding the defendant's propensity to commit future violent acts); Stewart,
427 S.E.2d at 407-08 (citing Savino to support the contention that 3:1 does not prohibit a mental
health expert's opinion regarding future dangerousness).
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